We consider a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) based on ring-LWE where reconciliation is performed on an N -dimensional lattice using Wyner-Ziv coding. More precisely, we consider Barnes-Wall lattices and use Micciancio and Nicolosi's bounded distance decoder with polynomial complexity O(N log 2 (N )). We show that in the asymptotic regime for large N , the achievable key rate is Θ(log N ) bits per dimension, while the error probability Pe ≈ O(e −Nǫ ). Unlike previous works, our scheme does not require a dither.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years, there have been many attractive developments in lattice-based cryptographic protocols, whose security is based on worst-case hardness assumptions, and which are conjectured to be secure against quantum attacks. Thus, lattice-based primitives are a promising candidate to replace constructions based on number theoretic assumptions like RSA [1] or Diffie-Hellman [2] that are currently in use.
One of the most versatile primitives for the design of provably secure cryptographic protocols is the learning with errors (LWE) problem introduced by Regev [3] . For instance it can serve for IND-CPA (Indistinguishability under chosenplaintext attack) [3] and IND-CCA (Indistinguishability under chosen-ciphertext attack) public key encryption [4] . A structured variant of LWE, the decision ring learning with errors (R-LWE) was proposed in [5] by Lyubashevsky et al. to allow more compact representations. Cryptographic applications of R-LWE include fast encryption [5] and fast homomorphic encryption [6] . Solving R-LWE is at least as hard as solving approximate SIVP on ideal lattices.
In [7] , Peikert introduced an efficient lattice-based key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) that allows two parties to share an ephemeral key that is useful for secret communications, featuring a low bandwidth reconciliation technique that aims to reach exact agreement on the shared key. A practical implementation of Peikert's protocol called NEWHOPE was proposed in [8] as a candidate to the NIST challenge on postquantum cryptography. In [7] and [8] , although key generation is performed using N -dimensional lattices, the reconciliation step uses 1-dimensional and 4-dimensional lattices respectively 1 .
In this paper, we consider a more general framework for KEM based on ring-LWE, that does not require a dither, and where reconciliation is done directly on the N -dimensional lattice using Wyner-Ziv coding.
More precisely, we consider Barnes-Wall lattices [10] and use Micciancio and Nicolosi's BDD decoder with polynomial complexity [11] for the reconciliation step. In particular, we prove that this decoder is linear. This result is required for our security proof and may also be of independent interest. In the asymptotic regime for large N , we show that this technique can generate Θ(log N ) bits of key per dimension. This improves upon [7] and [8] where the key rates are 1 bit and 1/4 bits per dimension respectively. Moreover, our scheme achieves exponentially small error probability P e ≈ O(e −N ǫ ), in particular P e = 2 −1675 when N = 1024. Although current recommendations are to keep the error probability smaller than 2 −128 , this may be too conservative when transforming an IND-CPA secure encryption scheme into an IND-CCA secure one using the Fujisaki-Okamoto transform [12] . A smaller error probability is desirable to prevent leakage of information from decryption failure attacks [13] .
Organization: This paper is organized as follows. In Section II we provide basic definitions about cyclotomic fields, lattices, etc. In Section III we present the Barnes-Wall lattice with some of its properties. In Section IV, we introduce our key generation algorithm. In Section V and VI, we provide a proof that the error probability is small, and that our scheme is IND-CPA secure respectively.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce the mathematical tools we use to describe and analyze our proposed scheme.
We write f (N ) = ω (g(N )) if lim N →∞ (f (N )/g(N )) = ∞, and f (N ) = Θ (g(N )) if f (N ) = O(g(N )) and g(N ) = O(f (N )). Finally a variant of O notation that "ignores" logarithmic factors: f (N ) =Õ (g(N )), equivalent to f (N ) = O g(N ) · log k (g(N )) for some integer k.
A. Lattices and Algebraic number theory
Lattice definitions: First of all, we define the space H as follows: when m ≥ 2 and N = ϕ(m) with ϕ the Euler's totient function, let
Note that H is a proper R-subspace of C N and is isomorphic to R N as an inner product space.
For our purposes, a lattice is a real full-rank discrete additive subgroup Λ ⊆ H. Any lattice is generated as the set of all integer linear combinations of N linearly independent basis vectors B = {b 1 , . . . , b N } in H as Λ = Λ (B) = B · z; z ∈ Z N . A fundamental cell P 0 of Λ is a bounded set, which, when shifted by the lattice points, generates a partition P = {P λ } of R N . For a fundamental cell P 0 , any point x ∈ R N can be uniquely expressed as a sum x = λ + x e , where λ ∈ Λ and x e ∈ P 0 .
We write λ = Q P(Λ) (x) and x e = x mod P 0 = x−Q P(Λ) (x). We will use implicitly in our proofs the fact that ∀x, y ∈ R N , and ∀λ ∈ Λ, (x mod Λ + y) mod Λ = (x + y) mod Λ as well as (x + λ) mod Λ = x mod Λ. Given a lattice Λ with basis B and a vector t such that dist(t, B) ≤ 1 2 d min (Λ), the bounded distance decoding problem is to find the lattice vector v ∈ Λ closest to t.
Cyclotomic fields and the canonical embedding: For an integer m ≥ 1, the m th cyclotomic number field is the extension K = Q(ξ m ) with degree N = ϕ(m), where ξ m is any m th primitive root of unity. We denote the ring of integers O K of K by R, its co-different by R ∨ , and define R q = R/qR for any integer q ≥ 1. In the same manner we can define R ∨ q . Note that R q is isomorphic to R ∨ q by an isomorphism θ [5, Lemma 2.15]. Now we describe the embedding of a cyclotomic number field, which induces a "canonical" geometry on it. Q(ξ m ) will has exactly N injective ring homomorphisms σ i : K → C, and we can define the canonical embedding σ : K → C N as σ(a) = (σ 1 (a), σ 2 (a), . . . , σ N (a)) ∈ H C N . This is a ring homomorphism from K to H, where multiplication and addition in the latter are both component-wise. We define norms and other geometric quantities on K simply by identifying field elements a ∈ K with their canonical embeddings σ(a) ∈ H, e.g., the l 2 norm is a 2 = σ(a) 2 .
When dealing with cyclotomic number fields, note that if m is a power of 2 with N = ϕ(m), then R ∨ = 1 N R, and σ(R) = √ N · Φ · Z N for some orthogonal matrix Φ [14] .
B. Error Distribution Subgaussian vectors:
A random vector X N in R N is subgaussian with parameter s > 0, if for any unit vector u ∈ R N and for any t ∈ R, E e 2πt X N ,u ≤ e πt 2 s 2 .
As a consequence of Theorem 1 in [15] , the following tail inequality holds. Theorem 1. Let X N be a subgaussian vector in R N with parameter s > 0. Then ∀ǫ > 0:
The following two propositions describe the sum and pointwise product behavior of subgaussians:
Proposition 2 ([16], Claim 2.4). Let X N be a subgaussian vector in R N of parameter s, and Y N another random vector. Then the point-wise multiplication vector
Gaussian-like distribution: When dealing with ring-LWE defined below, we work with a Gaussian-like error distribution over the number field K. We first define the N -dimensional i.i.d. Gaussian distribution D r ′ with zero mean and covariance r ′ . Then we define the Gaussian distribution ψ over K ⊗ Q R to output an element a ∈ K ⊗ Q R for which σ(a) ∈ H has Gaussian distribution D r ′ with parameter r ′ . In our application, we discretize ψ to R ∨ using coordinate-wise randomized rounding [16] and denote the resulting distribution by χ = ⌊ψ⌉ R ∨ .
Proposition 3 ([16], Lemma 8.2). If ψ is a continuous
Gaussian with parameter r ′ ≥ 1, and we use coordinatewise randomized rounding, then
where rad(m) is the product of all distinct primes dividing m.
C. Ring-LWE
We define the notion of key encapsulation mechanism (KEM). Following [7] , a KEM with ciphertext space C and (finite) key space K is given by efficient algorithms Setup, Gen, Encaps and Decaps, having the following structure:
• Setup() outputs a public parameter pp. • Gen(pp) outputs a public encapsulation key pk and secret decapsulation key sk. • Encaps(pp; pk) outputs a ciphertext c ∈ C and a key k ∈ K. • Decaps(sk; c) outputs some k ∈ K ∪ {error term}. A KEM satisfies IND-CPA security, if the outputs of the following "real" and "ideal" games are computationally indistinguishable:
Output(pp, pk, c, k * )
Ring-LWE:
We state the ring-LWE problem in its discretized form. First of all, let's define the ring-LWE distribution:
q is generated by choosing a ← R q uniformly at random, choosing e ← χ, and outputting (a, b = a · s + e) ∈ R q × R ∨ q . Definition 2 (Ring-LWE, Decision). The decision version of the ring-LWE problem, denoted R-DLWE q,χ , is to distinguish with non-negligible advantage between independent samples from A s,χ , where s $ ← − χ is chosen once and for all, and the same number of uniformly random and independent samples from
The following result extends the hardness guarantees to the case of discrete error. We make use of what is called a valid discretization from Section 2.4.2 in [16] :
, Lemma 2.24). Let ⌊·⌉ be a coordinate-wise randomized rounding to R ∨ . If R-DLWE q,ψ is hard given ℓ samples, then so is the variant of R-DLWE q,χ in which the secret is sampled from χ given ℓ − 1 samples. Remark 1. To apply Theorem 3 with two samples, we let ℓ = 3. Hence ψ is a continuous Gaussian with parameter r ′ = q · α · (3N/ log(3N )) 1/4 .
III. BARNES-WALL LATTICES AND THE MICCIANCIO-NICOLOSI BDD DECODER
The Barnes-Wall lattice BW n is an N = 2 n dimensional lattice over the Gaussian integers G = Z[i] ∼ = Z 2 [11, 10] . Note that BW n can be seen as a real lattice contained in Z 2N = Z 2 n+1 . Moreover, d min (BW n ) = √ N and Vol(BW n ) = √ N N . Micciancio and Nicolosi [11] give a polynomial time algorithm to solve the bounded distance decoding (BDD) for Barnes-Wall lattices: given a vector s ∈ C N within distance d min /2 = √ N /2 from some lattice point λ in BW n , find λ. This algorithm called PARBW has complexity O N log 2 N and we can prove that it is linear in the following sense: We can also scale the Barnes-Wall lattice by an N × N matrix T to obtain T · BW n . For invertible matrix T and s ∈ C N we define the operation PARBW T as:
, and x mod(T · BW n ) = x − PARBW T (x). It is not hard to prove that for λ ′ ∈ T ·BW n and s ∈ C N , PARBW T (λ ′ +s) = λ ′ + PARBW T (s), and (s + λ ′ ) mod(T · BW n ) = s mod(T · BW n ).
IV. KEY GENERATION ALGORITHM
We give here the key generation algorithm below between Alice and Bob. Parameters are q; N = [K : Q] and error distribution χ on R ∨ Alice (Server)
We start by considering the lattice
. Note that σ induces an isomorphism between the additive quotient groups R ∨ q and Λ 0 /qΛ 0 = Λ 0 /Λ 3 . With slight abuse of notation, in the rest of the paper we identify the two quotient groups. For the remaining two lattices, we choose Λ 1 (quantization lattice) and Λ 2 (coding lattice) with partitions P 1 , P 2 into fundamental sets such that the operation Q Pi(Λi) can be done in polynomial time for i = 1, 2 and such that Q Λ2 performs BDD, i.e. given s ∈ Z 2N within distance d min (Λ 2 )/2 from λ ∈ Λ 2 , Q Λ2 (s) = λ. We will use the notation Q Λi when there is no ambiguity about the chosen partition. Moreover, we impose that Λ 2 ⊆ Λ 0 and Λ 3 ⊆ Λ 2 ⊆ Λ 1 .
The reconciliation rate og the protocol is R P = 1 N · log 2 Vol(Λ2) Vol(Λ1) , and the key rate R K = 1 N · log 2 Vol(Λ3) Vol(Λ2) . We suppose that the error terms e, e ′ , e ′′ , and the secret terms s, s ′ , are taken independently from the χ distribution on R ∨ , which is subgaussian with parameter r (see Proposition 3). We define the modulus to noise ratio as the quotient between the modulus q and the parameter r of the error distribution χ. A smaller modulus to noise ratio provides stronger concrete security against known attacks. Moreover, since all the exchanged messages are modulo q, the size of q affects the overhead of the protocol. Table I , the KEM algorithm consists of the following steps: 
Referring to
and k in Λ 2 /Λ 3 such that
• Decaps(sk = s, c = (u, r)) : Alice computes v ′ := θ −1 (u) · s and outputsk = Rec(v ′ , r).
Remark 2.
This algorithm can essentially be seen as a generalization of the KEM in [7] and [8] , where the reconciliation step is also lattice-based. For instance, in [8] the functions HelpRec and Rec can be written in the form (1) and (2) by taking Λ 0 = Z 1024 , and the product lattices Λ 1 = (qD 4 /2 r ) 256 , Λ 2 = (qD 4 ) 256 . Note that unlike [7, 8] , a dither is not required in our algorithm.
a) Construction using Barnes-Wall lattices:
For an explicit construction we choose Λ 1 = Λ 0 and Λ 2 = T · BW n−1 , where T = β · 1 √ N · Φ and β a power of 2. By this choice, all the operations with Λ 2 in Table I can be deduced from Section III. The operation PARBW T corresponds to a quantization operation Q Λ2,P induced by a partition P of the Barnes-Wall lattice: PARBW T = Q Λ2,P (see Theorem 4) . Since βBW n−1 ⊆ BW n−1 ⊆ Z N , we obtain that Λ 2 ⊆ Λ 1 = Λ 0 . For the inclusion Λ 3 ⊆ Λ 2 , we must have qZ N ⊆ βBW n−1 , or q β Z N ⊆ BW n−1 . By Proposition 4, this is true when
Note that the key rate of the protocol is 1 4 log N − 1 4 ≈ Θ(log N ).
V. ERROR PROBABILITY
Here we give a general estimation for the error probability P{k =k}, and then specialize to the case when Λ 2 is a Barnes-Wall lattice. We start by observing that v = ass ′ + es ′ + e ′′ and v ′ = ass ′ + e ′ s, therefore v = v ′ +ē withē = es ′ + e ′′ − e ′ s. Define the quantization error
In the expressions of the shared keys we obtain
Note that k =k if Q Λ2 (e Q ) = 0 and Q Λ2 (e Q −ē) = 0.
To simplify the analysis we suppose from now on that Λ 0 = Λ 1 so that e Q = 0. 2 Due to the BDD assumption for Q Λ2 , we have that k =k if ē ≤ 1 2 d min (Λ 2 ). Now we want to estimate
(4) For any constant c > 0, by the law of total probability the term (4) can be bounded by
e 2 ≤c, s 2≤c.
(5) Assuming that e 2 ≤ c, and s ′ is subgaussian with parameter r, then by Proposition 2, we can say that σ(e) ⊙ σ(s ′ ) is subgaussian with parameter σ(e) 2 · r; and so es ′ is subgaussian with parameter c · r. Following the same argument, given that s 2 ≤ c we get that e ′ s is subgaussian with parameter c · r. Since e ′′ is subgaussian with parameter r, then under the condition that e 2 ≤ c and s 2 ≤ c we obtain using Proposition 1:
e is subgaussian with parameterr = r · 2c 2 + 1.
Therefore, by Theorem 1 if we set
Using Proposition 3 with m a power of 2, one can say r 2 = r ′2 + 2π · rad(m)/m = r ′2 + 2π/N. So r 2 N = N r ′2 + 2π = N q 2 α 2 (3N/ log(3N ) + 2π. Note that in R-LWE we need that α < log(N )/N , q = poly(N ) and αq ≥ ω( √ log N ) (see Theorem 2) .
When dealing with our explicit construction in paragraph IV-a, the condition on d min becomes for large N :
In order to satisfy condition (8) and to minimize the error probability, we choose according to (
For example, we can choose
It is not hard to see that these are the only values of α and q, up to logarithmic factors, that satisfy the R-LWE conditions and equation (9) . With this choice, it follows from the bound (6) that the error probability can be as small as 2 −1675 for N = 1024. Note that the modulus to noise ratio q/r of our scheme is of orderÕ N 7/4 , i.e. the same as in [7] .
VI. SECURITY
We will prove that the algorithm is IND-CPA secure, assuming the hardness of R-DLWE q,χ given two samples. This proof is generic and holds in the setting of the key generation protocol in Section IV independently of the choice of the lattices Λ 1 and Λ 2 as long as Q Pi(Λi) can be done efficiently. We follow the same argument as Section 4.2 in [7] . We consider the adjacent games below:
Output (a, b, (u, r), k * )
Notice that Game 1 is the "real" game defined in Section II, and Game 1' is the "ideal" one. Our aim is to prove that Game 1 and Game 1' are computationally indistinguishable. We'll do so sequentially.
Clearly Game 1 and Game 2 are computationally indistinguishable under the assumption of hardness of R-DLWE q,χ .
To prove that Game 2 and Game 3 are computationally indistinguishable, we use the following Theorem which is essentially a consequence of the Crypto Lemma [17, Lemma 4.1.1]. It guarantees uniformity of the key without a dither.
q is uniformly random, then k = Rec(v, r) is uniformly random, given r = HelpRec(v).
Hence, π k,k ′ is a permutation of R ∨ q by Lemma 1. The proof of Theorem 5 results from these lemmas:
Proof:
We conclude the proof of Theorem 5 by showing that k is uniform and independent of r when v is uniform:
Returning to Game 2 and Game 3, we construct an efficient reduction S as follows: it takes as input two pairs (a, u),
After that, we will take two indistinguishable inputs, and hence, by efficiency of S, get two indistinguishable outputs. First suppose that the inputs are drawn from A s ′ ,χ ; i.e. u = as ′ + e ′ and v = b ′ s ′ + e ′′ = θ −1 (b)s ′ + e ′′ for independent e ′ , e ′′ ←− χ; and then a, b are uniformly random and independent from R q and R ∨ q respectively (because θ is an isomorphism). Hence, the output of S will be exactly as in Game 2. Now suppose that the inputs given to S are uniformly random in R q × R ∨ q and independent, then the outputs of S are exactly as in Game 3. In fact, a, b, u, v are uniform, and hence by Theorem 5, k is uniformly random conditioned on r = HelpRec(v).
To show that Game 3 and Game 1' are indistinguishable, we modify Game 1 and Game 2 by choosing k * $ ← − Λ 2 /Λ 3 and output it instead of k. In this case Game 1 becomes Game 1'. Let Game 2' be the modified version of Game 2. By the same reasoning as above, we can prove that Game 1' is computationally indistinguishable from Game 2' and Game 3.
Remark 3. Following the steps in [7, Section 5], we can construct a passively secure encryption scheme based on our passively secure KEM, which yields an actively secure encryption scheme and an actively secure key transport protocol.
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APPENDIX PROOF OF THEOREM 4
In the following we refer to the functions PARBW, SEQBW, RMDEC in Algorithms 1,2 and 3 of Micciancio and Nicolosi's paper [11] .
A. Modification
We modify Algorithm 3 in [11] in the case r = 0 as follows: if bj =0 ρ j = bj =1 ρ j , then return b 1 · [1, 1, . . . , 1] . It means that we choose the output vector based on the first bit of b. Note that the decoder is still BDD with this modification.
B. Linearity of PARBW
In this subsection we will prove the following proposition:
Proposition 5. Let λ ∈ BW n and w ∈ C N a target, where N = 2 n , then
We will prove this by induction on p and N . The cases p = 1 or N = 1 will be proven in the next subsection. Now consider the case where p ≥ 4 and s / ∈ C 1 . Suppose that Proposition 5 holds for N/2-dimensional vectors and p/4 processors; we will show that it also holds for N -dimensional vectors and p processors. 
Here we use implicitly the fact that [λ 0 , λ 1 ] ∈ BW n =⇒ λ 0 , λ 1 ∈ BW n−1 . Note that = λ + z − 0 (w). Following the same steps, we can prove that z + 0 (s) = λ + z + 0 (w), z − 1 (s) = λ + z − 1 (w), z + 1 (s) = λ + z + 1 (w).
The algorithm will return the value z ′ (s) in {z + 0 (s), z − 0 (s), z + 1 (s), z − 1 (s)} such that s − z ′ (s) is minimal. This is equivalent to saying that z ′ (s) ∈ {λ + z + 0 (w), λ + z − 0 (s), λ + z + 1 (s), λ + z − 1 (s)} such that (λ + w) − (λ + z * * (w)) = w − z * * (w) is minimal. In any case, the output is of the form λ + PARBW(p, w).
Our next step now is to prove that Proposition 5 holds for p = 1 or s ∈ C 1 . In this case Algorithm 1 returns SEQBW(0, λ + w). This function is presented in Algorithm 2.
C. Linearity of SEQBW(r, * )
In this subsection we refer to the functions t(s) = (b(s), ρ(s)) and RMDEC(r, t) = RMDEC(r, b, ρ) in Algorithms 2 and 3 and to the function ψ : F N 2 → Z[i] N defined in [11] . Recall that each vector λ in BW n can be written as
where c n ∈ G N and c r ∈ RM n r for r = 0, . . . , n − 1. For any 0 ≤ r ≤ n, let BW n r = n−1 k=r φ k−r ψ(c k ) + φ n−r cn : c k ∈ RM n k , cn ∈ G N
